2022, Vol. 4, Issue 3, Part C

Gilbert Ryle in The Consent of Mind has argued that mind is not the name of an entity ontologically different than body. It is not, as opposed to the body, private, inner, Internal or covert, enjoying a status of its own. It is the name of human ability, capacity, inclination, tendency, proneness or disposition to act or react in certain ways. While propounding the above the nis, he is confronted with a battery of concepts like 'not leing', 'applying one's mind', ete, all brought under the heading of 'mindias'. Ryle argues against the traditionalists that 'minding what one is doing' does not mean two synchronous and coupled acts of minding at the mental level and doing at the physical level since it is not analogous to 'humming while walking'. Moreover, the traditionalists' conception suffers from infinite regress. Ryle me intains that heed statements are mongrel-categorical statements.