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The concept of heed

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Abstract

Gilbert Ryle in *The Consent of Mind* has argued that mind is not the name of an entity ontologically different than body. It is not, as opposed to the body, private, inner, Internal or covert, enjoying a status of its own. It is the name of human ability, capacity, inclination, tendency, proneness or disposition to act or react in certain ways. While propounding the above the *nis*, he is confronted with a battery of concepts like 'not leing', 'applying one's mind', etc, all brought under the heading of 'mindias'. Ryle argues against the traditionalists that 'minding what one is doing' does not mean two synchronous and coupled acts of minding at the mental level and doing at the physical level since it is not analogous to 'humming while walking'. Moreover, the traditionalists' conception suffers from infinite regress. Ryle me intains that heed statements are mongrel-categorical statements.

Keywords: Ontologically, ability, capacity, inclination, tendency, proneness

Introductions

In his scholarly and original work "The Concept of Mind", Gilbert Ryle work fried his best to show that mind is not the name of an entity ontologically different from body. By analysing mental concepts on the line of their everyday use, he has attempted to establish that mind as understood by the traditionalists is a mistake because nowhere in the analysis of mind involving concepts or sentences, we do everfind a reference to an entity which as opposed to the body is private, inner, internal the or Covert, enjoying a status of its own. He has on the contrary argued that mind is the Name of human ability, capacity, hent, inclination, proneness or act or react in certain disposition to ways in appropriate Situations. Thus white accordingt the traditionalists, the word "knows in the sentence 'He knows French'" refers to a peatiarly external or courable stat or activity of the individual which he alone is directly apprised, according to Ryte this means that the individual has the disposition or ability to do a few things publicly observable y need arises; eg. If someone addressed him in French, he will reply in French; if he is given o a French newspaper, he reads and framlates the news correctly into his mother tongue etc. Thus mind for Ryle. tion of human body disposi to behave according to the needs of the situation. It is not.

The name or process the name actual a of entity. Or substance in the Cartesian sense, it is of typical human behaviours, possible. White engaged in propounding a thesis componted with such Conce- of this sest, he is pts as noticing, taking care, applying end's mind, concentrating, putting one's heart wito something, thinking what one is doing, alertness, interest, intentness, studying and trying. All these are bad heed concepts grouped under the heading of "minding" by Ryte. Now the question is: When one speaker of minding what are is doing, e.g, minding what one is - is saying or whistling, does not the use Verbs ho of Letore ""minding" and "saying" or "mending andy Whistling refer to two synchronous L and coupled acts or or processes. Going at two levels, one physical and the other mental? Ryle's answer to this question strictly negative. Minding what one is He laying or Whistling Cannot be the coupling of two activities because if the saying or whistling is stoppes minding cannot go on all Humming white walking. By itself. Are two activ- ities because in the absence the other can go on. All of by itself. But that is not true of minding what one is Saying Whistling. Moreover, the use active verbs taken like "minding and "Saying" or "Whistling? need note suggest two activities for the Reed Verte can easily be replaced by heed advert. The phrase "minding what one is saying cohustling? can he replaced by the phrase "Saying whistling attentively? The latter phrase Containing 2 suggesting that adjective has the merit epe activity *viz* laying whistling, having a special character, is being performed.

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That special character, Ryle maintains, is not Witnessable. But that should not mislead one to believe that "Saying or whistling attentively," means the coupling of a physical activity of saying or whistling with a mental activity of paying attention. Nor should it mean that the phrase refers to a purely dispositional State of the speaker or whistler for in that case while it would be proper the person as would not be paying saying proper to describe of whistling now, to describe of attention. Now since a traditional phrase it him dispositive statement narrates no incidents. A dispositional statement, Ryle holds, is so to say inference-ticket which enables one to predict the behaviours or of persons or things. Since it is quite legitimate to speak of paying attention to saying. Whistling at the moment, the phrase - saying or whistling attentively cannot refer to disposition only. A dispositional statement, comprising of heed Verle or advert, according Ryle, to and semi- a semi-dispositional episodic statement. It means that the performer of the action is doing one of the several things that he is disposed to do at the moment. That is, to be with- heed is to be in the mood or frame of mind to do, if required, lots of things which it may not have been actually requires ipse facto to be in the mood or of mind to do at least this one or frame thing was actually required." (The Concept of Mind, page 141).

Driving Carefully to be in the frame of mind to meet various sorts of emergencies that may arise but have not arisen. It ipso facto means the incident or occurrence of saving the car from accident at the Cross road or pedestrian from being hit places. saving the overrun at Heed Concept, therefore, mean both a disposition and an occurrence". Ryle maintains that paying attention to something? is analyzable into two parts: (a) a categorical Statement that a certain activity is taking place, e.g. the driver is driving the car and to be a hypothetical or dispositional statement about how the individual in question would behave if certain contingencies were to arise, e.g. if the driver met chuck-holes or pedestrians, he would try his best to avoid the risk of accident. Ryle calls a head statement a "mongrel - Categorical or Semi-dispositional" statement. He further contends that paying attention to what one is doing entails at least two important dispositions: (1) the disposition to give a first hand report of what it is one has been paying heed to and (2) the disposition to adapt one's performance to the various demands of the task as they may arise. A heed statement, therefore, reports an occurrence according to a disposition or frame of mind. It does not report coupling of a physical operation with an ontologically different operation of reading minding.

That minding does not refer operation of ontologically different status shown also with the help of Reductio ad absurdum argument. Ryle argues that if the traditional or contemplative view of heed were true, the difference between a careful and loveless spectator would be said to lie in the fact that while the careful spectator would undergo watching his an additional process of watching (day a bird in the lawn), the Careless spectator would not undergo such an additional process. This interpretation, I accepted, would lead to an infinite regress, since it would always be sensible to ask whether or not this watching one's contaking was done carefully.

The above, in short, is the view that Ryle puts forward on heed concepts in order to do away with the traditionalists' concept of mind. The plausibility of his account would certainly make it acceptable on the ground of parsimony we

must, therefore, examine his theory to see whether or not in order to discover a satisfactory alternative to the traditional view.

As we have seen above, Ryle has mainly advanced attention to two operations to arguments against the traditionalists' notion of mind: (1) the argument that 'paying attention to something' cannot mean the combining of two operations since it is not analogous to humming while walking and (2) the Reductio ad absurdum argument, by which it is shown that the postulation of mind- as a separate activity leads to an infinite regress. We will examine these arguments, one by one: As to the first argument it is not clear how Ryle can dispense with "minding" on the ground that mending as a mental activity that one is doing? not analogous to humming while walking. Every Ryle minding the traditionalists will agree with Ryle that the former is not analogous to the latter in the sense that while two distinct sets of muscular movements go on simultaneously only in the latter, only one set of muscular movements goes on in the former. But that only shows that mending "I is not an activity in the sense of ordinary activities having ordinary movements. It does not count as a non-physical activity, not that it is activity at all. Has 'minding' while driving not been some sort of a separate activity for process than driving, it would ipso facto not be possible. to discontinue minding as one driving. But just as walking and discontinue minding, one can, one is and continue sufficiently foot hardy, continue "driving and discontinue minding. It is true, Ryle says, that one cannot continue minding and discontinue driving. But that is becoming minding involves some such thing reading. -digging it is in the nature of mending to involve some such thing. Admittedly, we do not know how the two are connected, specially when what is attended to is a physical process. But that is just the Mind-Body problem. We do not require to understand a connection in order to be satisfied that a connection exists. As a matter of fact, there is one important point of difference between "minding what one is humming "doing on the one hand and "balking" on the other. Whereas minding by nature requires something to pay attention to, e.g. driving & reading, it is not in the nature of any other either "walking" activity a difference, to infer "humming" to require "minding what one is doing? on the analogy of humming while walking, would be "die Werk! Ryle's "humming paradigm Case as a walking' apparently the coupling activities shows his bias in favour of one world. viz the physical world. Instead of showing that the physical world alone is true, he seems to presume that it alone is true and on the basis of such presumption he rejects minding as a peculiar sort of activity which contrasts, for example, the driver's limbs by regulating his consciousness to the stimuli to which he responds.

Let us now come to Ryle's Reductio ad absurdum argument whereby he proves an infinite regress in the traditionalists' notion of mind- doing. According to him, a heedful watching on the traditionalists' part, would entail watching one's watching: this watching of one's watching to be heedful would presuppose a further watching and soon an ad infinitum. Now, it is not difficult to see this interpretation of the traditionalists' notion of mind makes mind a mere series of different degrees of consciousness like walking which is a mere series of different steps. It is only on the basis of mind as a mere summation of different bits of consciousness that one can talk of going back from one consciousness to another and so indefinitely. But in order to talk of watching one's watching,

it is not ne involved in mind of this sort and be to commit a Very well talk of "watching. 1" and "watching this watching" traditionalists' idea of the span of There is normally a considerable num on the attention. gean of attention in which of distinct data are discriminated. Except in the &e are case an of completely undivided attention, attention fluctuates leading to the knowledge of a robin and the knowledge of watching the robin. The process and the object form part of complex whole of experience. Beseries, one there is no reason why the contemplative view should force us to adopt ayetle take the difference between a tortion that and a loveless Careful spectator would lie in watching and non- watching ef one's that minding watching, Ryffe himself or attention can Vary en degree. Accomingly, the difference leetween a Careful and a careless spectator may Reasonabl be said to lie in the amount of hecol that each pays to his object of attention A Careless Spectator as contrasted with a careful one is not one who fails to watch his watching. He is one who cannot have a rich and vivid impression of what is going on, on account heed that he pays to it of insufficient.

Importance

"Heed" generally means to pay attention to or take notice of something. It implies a level of awareness, consideration, or careful attention to a particular thing or situation. The concept of heed is important in various aspects of life:

Communication

- Heeding what others say is crucial for effective communication. It shows respect and understanding.
- In written communication, paying heed to details can enhance clarity and avoid misunderstandings.

Safety

Heeding warnings and instructions is vital for personal safety. Whether it's in traffic, at work, or in any potentially hazardous situation, paying attention can prevent accidents.

Learning

Heeding instructions in educational settings is fundamental to learning and academic success. Students who pay attention in class are more likely to understand and retain information.

Relationships

In personal relationships, paying heed to the needs and feelings of others is essential for building strong connections. It fosters empathy and understanding.

Decision Making

Heeding advice and considering different perspectives is important in making well-informed decisions. It helps avoid impulsive choices and minimizes the risk of negative consequences.

Professionalism

- In the workplace, heeding instructions from supervisors, colleagues, and clients is crucial for productivity and success. It also contributes to a positive work environment.

As to Ryle's Contention that paying means attention mead being disposed to give a first hand report of what is attended and to make a better show of the activity, rally and normally

seem to be a paying things. It is true that on is, is gene But thee does not the case. Cessary nece. Attention and connection between. Being disposed to do these It is not inconceivable to think of one who while paying attention to something may not feed inclined or disposed to give a report. Of what he attended for may attend and fail to notice. It is time that if one notices Som- ethings he is capacitated to mention it and point it out but to say that one has noticed Something and to say that one has paid atter-tion to some omething Tid not to Ryle appears to think that, attention former are Say "noticing" the samething алд paying Synonymous. But whereas the is an achievement word, the latter is an activity word. Forther, it is not always true to that minding? Paying -Day attention entails the dispo- sition to adapt one's performance to the Venious demands the task as they may clovely teacher may arise. However. a school hey bay attend to the seasons on arithmetic in his classroom, not be able to meet the demands of may of the task of solving similar but intricate questions in the examination that to talk of meeting the various demands of the task, close or acute attention to what one cloes, without not prove distinguishing the relevant from the Errelevant features of the circumstance, helpful may Au the performance of the task itself Ene's attention succeeds when one becomes fully Conscious of these features of the situation which are relevant to the successful performance the task.

Ryte introduces the concept of "mongrel- categorical" for explaining heed. Heed state- ments are, according to him, partly disposite- onal and partly episodic. This interpretation on of heed, however, gives. a set back to his original theory which he builds on occur- Cordle- disposition dichoten takes great pains "The Concept of Mind, he In his book to elucillate the logic of clispestion - woorde 20 different from the logic of Episode - werds. This The distinction he draws inlorder to construct and elaborate his central thesis that "to talk of a person's mind, is to talk of the person's abilities, liabilities and incli- nations to do and undergo certain sorts of things, and of the doing and undergoing of these things in the ordinary world? (The Concept of Mind, p. 199). When, therefore, he Correlates relaxes this distinction and talks of mongrel - Categorical' concept, this modifies and weakens his general This account of the way Ryle preach approach to mont heed, it is obvious that we cannot talk of any special activity called talk of only the P attentive, cattending? We performance of an activity. But paying of attention, in that case, would be confined to individual's own activities and it would be nonsensical to talk of someone paying attention to other other than an anything activity which he himself "listening"). Quit "xpressions like "watching, "eleserving" and "descrying? Which entail feed, according to Rifle himself, do not refer to activities like reading book, which may poter a not be performed with heed; they they to special forms of the activity of theca-paying itself.

Conclusion

While propounding the above the nis, he is confronted with a battery of concepts like 'not leing', 'applying one's mind', etc, all brought under the heading of 'mindias'. Ryle argues against the traditionalists that 'minding what one is doing' does not mean two synchronous and coupled acts of minding at the mental level and doing at the physical level since it is not analogous to 'humming while walking'. Moreover, the traditionalists' conception suffers from infinite regress. Ryle me intains that heed statements are mongrel-categorical statements. One can, however, raise

doubts against Ryle's views. The traditionalists' notion of minding cannot easily be refuted by showing disparity with humming while walking'. The argument of infinite regress is based on the doubtful conception of mind as a mere summation of the bits of consciousness. The introduction of the concept of 'mongrel-categorical' weakens occurrence-disposition dichotomy on which the central structure of his thesis stands. 'Minding' does not necessarily mean disposition to give a first hand report and to adapt one's performance to the various demands of the task. On Ryle's view we can talk of only the attentive performance of an activity, which is absurd.

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